The gap in every LAN transfer

When someone sends you a file with LocalSend, you see an alias like “Galaxy S23” and, in the security dialog, a fingerprint. The transfer itself is encrypted — but the alias is free text anyone can set, and the fingerprint is just a hash with no name attached. On a coffee-shop or conference network, “Chris's MacBook” is a claim, not a fact.

The fingerprint is real cryptography, though: it's the SHA-256 of the certificate the device generated for itself. Whoever holds that certificate's private key is that fingerprint. The only missing piece is a trustworthy directory that says whose it is. That's a job for a handle.

Today: publish your fingerprint available now

Copy your device fingerprint from LocalSend (Settings → the device card, or the security dialog during a transfer) and add it to your username.md profile. Anyone receiving a file from you can open username.md/you and compare fingerprints before accepting.

Next: verified devices rolling out

Self-asserted is the floor, not the ceiling. The attestation layer binds your fingerprint to your handle cryptographically:

Stock LocalSend on both ends — verification happens beside the transfer, not inside it. No fork, no protocol change, nothing to reinstall.

What it looks like

$ username localsend verify 2f9d44a1c87e03b6…
# resolving fingerprint against username.md …
# verified @chris — "Chris MBP" (desktop) · attestation valid, expires in 23 days

$ curl -s https://username.md/api/v1/lookup/device/2f9d44a1c87e03b6… | jq '.handle'
# "chris" — response carries an RFC 9421 signature, like everything here

CLI and lookup API are part of the verified-devices rollout. The fingerprint-on-profile step above works today.

Why anchor it here

username.md already proves identity to people, apps, and agents — signed profiles, did:web, A2A AgentCards, MCP. A LocalSend fingerprint is just one more key that deserves a name on it. One handle, every device.

Claim your handle →