LocalSend fingerprintLocalSend is the open-source, local-network AirDrop alternative. It shows receivers a device name and a fingerprint — nothing proves who's behind them. Your handle can.
When someone sends you a file with LocalSend, you see an alias like “Galaxy S23” and, in the security dialog, a fingerprint. The transfer itself is encrypted — but the alias is free text anyone can set, and the fingerprint is just a hash with no name attached. On a coffee-shop or conference network, “Chris's MacBook” is a claim, not a fact.
The fingerprint is real cryptography, though: it's the SHA-256 of the certificate the device generated for itself. Whoever holds that certificate's private key is that fingerprint. The only missing piece is a trustworthy directory that says whose it is. That's a job for a handle.
Copy your device fingerprint from LocalSend (Settings → the device
card, or the security dialog during a transfer) and add it to your
username.md profile. Anyone receiving a file from you can open
username.md/you and compare fingerprints before accepting.
Self-asserted is the floor, not the ceiling. The attestation layer binds your fingerprint to your handle cryptographically:
fingerprint ↔ @you, published on your profile and verifiable offline./verify/localsend, run username localsend verify, or let an agent call the verify_device MCP tool. Receivers see verified @you, not “Galaxy S23”.Stock LocalSend on both ends — verification happens beside the transfer, not inside it. No fork, no protocol change, nothing to reinstall.
CLI and lookup API are part of the verified-devices rollout. The fingerprint-on-profile step above works today.
username.md already proves identity to people, apps, and agents — signed
profiles, did:web, A2A AgentCards, MCP. A LocalSend
fingerprint is just one more key that deserves a name on it. One handle, every
device.